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As southern states steadily seceded in the fi rst months of 1861, the British 
press speculated that the Morrill Tari; ’s passage was an underlying cause 
of secession, or at least a barrier to reunion. Contemporaries on both sides 
of the Atlantic were well aware that the tari;  would greatly a; ect European 
diplomacy with both North and South, to the former’s detriment and the 
latter’s favor.
The Union’s Morrill Tari; , which Henry C. Carey, the “Ajax of protec-
tionism,” infl uenced and lobbied for, contrasted sharply with the South’s 
free trade advocacy. The Morrill Tari;  had been an important component 
of the 1860 Republican platform, which ended up a tentative triumph 
for the party’s Whig faction, as it also called for internal improvements, a 
Pacifi c railroad, and a homestead law.1 The British, in turn, viewed the pro-
tective tari;  with great trepidation, as it threatened British manufactures 
and proved antithetical to a subject about which, as English statesman 
Richard Cobden pointed out in December 1861, the British “are unani-
mous and fanatical”; that subject was free trade.2 By the time of the Civil 
War, free trade had become a national ideology in Britain.3
The Morrill Tari; ’s new levels of protection on specifi c items such as pig 
iron and wool severely hit at Britain’s exports to its largest single market, 
the United States.4 The seceding southern states, providing England with 
nearly 80 percent of its raw cotton imports, alternatively o; ered Britain 
the promise of free trade. In Britain, the tari;  thus played an integral role 
in justifying southern secession; developing Confederate trade policy; and 
a; ecting public opinion in England, Ireland, and Scotland concerning the 
causes of southern secession and the possibility of European recognition of 
the Confederacy.5 Over the course of the Civil War, the tari;  sparked a con-
tentious debate in Great Britain over southern motivations for secession. 
When the Union did not immediately declare itself on a crusade for aboli-
tion, some in Britain sympathized with the South.6 Northern sympathiz-
ers and antislavery advocates would afterward maintain that slavery had 
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been the primary issue all along, while the Confederacy’s transatlantic sup-
porters and parts of the British press at fi rst commonly portrayed the war 
as one fought between northern proponents of protection and southern 
advocates of free trade, a view that contemporary southerners and their 
British sympathizers made sure to encourage.
Recent studies of Civil War foreign relations have o@ ered strong argu-
ments for why Britain maintained its neutral stance throughout the con-
fl ict by emphasizing the strong transatlantic diplomatic and fi nancial ties 
that had developed by the mid-nineteenth century.7 While persuasive, such 
studies have done so while overlooking British reaction to the tari@  at the 
time it was passed. Although the Morrill Tari@  may not have endangered 
British investment in the United States, it greatly ruI  ed Britain’s com-
mercial feathers and editorial pages. As Martin Crawford has observed, the 
tari@ ’s impact on British opinion “was certainly greater than most modern 
historians have been willing to admit.”8 Yet, aside from the recent work of 
Duncan Campbell, the tari@  issue has become little more than a footnote 
within the diplomatic histories of the Civil War.9 The Civil War itself has 
received so much transatlantic study that the minimizing of the tari@  issue 
is all the more striking.10 Brian Jenkins and Howard Jones have concluded 
that the Morrill Tari@  did not help the Confederacy gain British support, 
and while David Crook, in his classic work The North, the South, and the 
Powers, briefl y acknowledges that the South sought to “exploit British 
resentment at the Union’s ‘new protectionism,’ symbolized by the Morrill 
tari@ , and o@ ered the lure of a free trade south as a vital new market for 
British goods” and that “southern propaganda excoriated the Morrill tar-
i@ ,” he o@ ers no further treatment of these subjects.11 Granted, these studies 
accurately portray the tari@ ’s small role in ultimately infl uencing the major 
decisions of Britain’s top policymakers. If, however, the Confederacy’s free 
trade diplomacy is expanded to include not only oY  cial state-to-state 
interactions but also the activities of non-state southern sympathizers and 
pro-Confederate propagandistic e@ orts to infl uence English public opin-
ion, then the tari@  debate takes on renewed signifi cance within Civil War 
foreign relations.
A more thorough treatment of the transatlantic tari@  debate is therefore 
sorely needed. A previous study of the English press during this period, 
for instance, has precipitously concluded that the Morrill Tari@  “had lit-
tle or no e@ ect on forming editorial opinion,” while Duncan Campbell’s 
study of English public opinion suggests that few British journals “actually 
laid part of the blame for secession on the tari@ ” and that such blame was 
“unusual.”12 This article demonstrates otherwise, while at the same time 
o@ ering a fuller picture of Great Britain’s reaction to the northern tari@  
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by incorporating Scottish and Irish responses as well. Potential pitfalls 
invariably arise when discussing British “opinion.” By drawing on a wide 
sampling of British news outlets, I am hopeful to have avoided some of 
these.13 With these caveats in mind, this article demonstrates that such 
British support for the South as existed went much further than support 
for self determination or opposition to fratricide, blockades, and democ-
racy; it was also an opposition to northern protectionism.
What attention the tariE  issue has received primarily revolves around 
defending or refuting Charles and Mary Beard’s emphasis on domestic 
economic motivations for the Civil War’s onset.14 Some viewed secession 
as little more than a replay of the Nullifi cation Crisis of the early 1830s, 
wherein South Carolina had threatened secession as a response to protec-
tionist legislation. As William Freehling has eE ectively argued, however, 
the tariE  question and slavery agitation had already largely become “inter-
meshed” by the earlier crisis of nullifi cation.15 Furthermore, although the 
tariE  issue was certainly raised in the secessionist conventions of South 
Carolina, Georgia, and Virginia, the topic was utterly overwhelmed by 
speeches concerning the perceived northern threat to the slave system 
practiced in the South and promised in the territories. A growing lack of 
southern cohesion on the tariE  issue and the succession of seceding south-
ern states in fact made the Morrill TariE ’s passage possible, suggesting in 
hindsight at least that the tariE  was by no means the primary motivating 
factor for secession.16 Nevertheless, many in Great Britain were not nearly 
so certain at the time of southern secession and the subsequent outbreak 
of civil war.
The Confederacy thereafter emphasized its desire for international free 
trade, dangling the carrot of free trade before Europe, even as it bran-
dished King Cotton’s stick. The Morrill TariE ’s March 1861 passage was 
correspondingly used to obtain southern sympathy in Europe during 
the fi rst years of the war. TariE -centered speculation regarding southern 
secession proliferated among numerous British news outlets and drew a 
surprising amount of initial sympathy from within the zealous Victorian 
empire of free trade, as well as British editorial and parliamentary spec-
ulation as to the tariE ’s centrality to the confl ict.17 Owing to its harmful 
eE ects upon British commerce and its unfriendly reception within the 
British press, the tariE  thus helped infl uence Anglo-American relations 
for years to come.
While southern free trade diplomacy did not ultimately earn British 
recognition for the Confederacy any more than did the diplomacy of 
King Cotton, in the fi rst years of the Civil War the northern tariE  handily 
oE ered a rationale for secession that was politically palatable for many in 
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free-trading Britain. Speculation regarding the tari4 ’s possible economic 
and diplomatic consequences peppered the editorial pages of England, 
Ireland, and Scotland. Along with the northern blockade of the South, 
British recognition of southern belligerency in May 1861, the Trent A4 air 
in November 1861, and the September 1862 Emancipation Proclamation, 
the South’s free trade argument and transatlantic propaganda created 
ambiguity, division, confusion, and southern support across the Atlantic, 
and further exacerbated already tense Union-British relations, aided by 
the Union’s initial refusal to tackle slavery. The South’s governmental and 
nongovernmental allies made good use of the Confederacy’s free trade 
diplomacy at the outset of the Civil War. The debate that followed the 
tari4 ’s passage created heated British editorial and parliamentary spec-
ulation concerning the primary causes of southern secession, with some 
politicians and numerous newspapers suggesting part or all of the blame 
lay with northern protectionism, thereby contributing to the looming pos-
sibility of British recognition of the South in the fi rst years of the war.
The Morrill Tari4  Act passed the U.S. House of Representatives on May 
10, 1860, on a sectional vote, with nearly all northern representatives in 
support and nearly all southern representatives in opposition. The bill 
was tabled in the Senate by Virginia’s Robert Hunter—future Confederate 
secretary of state and author of the low 1857 tari4 —until after the 1860 
elections.18 While the bill hung in political limbo, its advocates and adver-
saries alike sprung into action. As Democratic senators attempted to fur-
ther postpone a vote on the bill, president-elect Lincoln, who was himself 
“in favor of the internal improvement system, and a high protective tari4 ,” 
promised a Pittsburgh audience that he would make sure that “no sub-
ject should engage your representatives more closely than the tari4  . . . so 
that when the time for action arrives adequate protection can be extended 
to the coal and iron of Pennsylvania, the corn of Illinois, and the ‘reapers 
of Chicago.’”19
The tari4  was welcomed in much of the North and generated a predict-
able outcry in much of the South.20 Following the resignation of a num-
ber of southern senators who might otherwise have voted against the bill 
and successfully stopped its passage, the Senate Finance Committee was 
restructured, Rhode Island’s James Fowler Simmons was made the com-
mittee’s chair, and the Morrill Tari4  passed on March 2, 1861. Democratic 
president James Buchanan, whose home state was the protectionist heart-
land of Pennsylvania, signed the bill into law with characteristic loyalty 
to his state. Ad valorem rates were raised from a low 17 percent to a mod-
est average of 26 percent; but the tari4  also contained specifi c protec-
tive duties approaching the high level of 50 percent or more on pig iron 
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and cutlery, for instance, for the express purpose of protecting American 
“infant industries.”
To both southerners dependent on foreign trade and British manu-
facturers, the bill appeared punitive, incendiary, and economically back-
ward. The tari@  quickly garnered British support for southern free trade. 
This was promptly clear to the London Times, which noted in late March 
1861 that the South’s goal was “to gain the goodwill of foreign nations, and 
particularly England, by placing Southern liberality in contrast with the 
grasping and narrow-minded legislation of the Free States. . . . So far the 
game is still in favour of the new Confederacy.”21
Across the Atlantic, southern secession initially received sympathy 
within the British press and public. The pro-North Liverpool Post recol-
lected that “nearly all the aristocracy and a large portion of the middle 
classes were adverse to the North and in favor of the South. . . . Out of four 
or fi ve hundred English newspapers, only fi ve were bold enough openly 
to support the North.” John Lothrop Motley, an American in Britain, 
observed in a letter to his mother “a very great change in English sym-
pathy” following the Morrill Tari@ ’s passage, as it had “done more than 
any commissioners from the southern Republic could do to alienate the 
feelings of the English public towards the United States.”22 In London, 
according to Confederate diplomat Edwin de Leon, the North at fi rst had 
only received staunch support primarily from the radical Daily News and 
its evening counterpart the Star, John Bright’s radical paper. De Leon 
even quoted antislavery advocate Henry Ward Beecher as saying at the 
war’s outset that the clergy, Parliament, and merchants were against the 
North. With the exception of the labor classes, “all . . . is anti-American,” 
and studies have since shown that neither was British labor by any means 
unanimous in its support for the Union.23 Union minister to France, John 
Bigelow, having just arrived in London in September 1861, noted that 
“American Republicanism . . . is right now very much out of fashion . . . my 
country has few friends left her . . . while the London press,” with but two 
exceptions, “rejoices in our humiliation.” Such sentiments were echoed by 
Charles Francis Adams Jr., who recalled with some exaggeration that the 
aristocracy, the press, and the middle class were all arrayed against the 
North.24 The New York Times also reported that the British had “entirely 
misapprehended the controversy,” as they had arrived at the belief “that the 
question of Slavery does not constitute the essence of the quarrel; that it 
has been merely introduced as a blind, or as an instrument of provocation, 
and that the real point of contention lies in the national Tari@ .”25 The tar-
i@  argument had certainly found an accepting audience, further splitting 
British public opinion.
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In late February 1861, with the secession of six southern states and 
but a few weeks before the tari: ’s ultimate passage into law, Democratic 
congressman Daniel Sickles of New York decried the tari: ’s passage as it 
o: ered “the strongest provocation to England to precipitate recognition 
of the southern confederacy.” The bill appeared to Sickles as “a disunion 
measure. It does as much as anything else to alienate the South from the 
Union. We all know that one of the questions that lie at the root of alien-
ation between North and South is the protective policy of the North and 
the free-trade policy of the South,” and the latter perceived that, now that 
the Republicans were in power, they intended to use that power “not only 
to assault their rights of property, but to tax them . . . to enrich the manufac-
turing classes of the North.”26 The pro-free trade New York World acknowl-
edged as well that the tari:  “greatly disa: ects England and France . . . and 
presents them a direct inducement to recognize . . . the independence of 
the states which reject both it and the policy on which it rests.”27 The New 
York Times similarly warned that, as Europe moved toward freer trade, the 
North’s passage of this “ill-timed, ill-advised, and . . . disastrous measure” 
would put it “in confl ict” with the Confederacy “in every court of Europe” 
and that it would seek recognition “by appealing to the popular sentiment 
in all commercial circles.”28 Secession had by no means ended transatlan-
tic opposition to the tari:  and its potential impact upon domestic and 
foreign relations.
The London Annual Register of 1861 took the tari: ’s passage to mean 
that the North did not want to reunite with the Confederacy.29 The north-
ern correspondent for London’s Whig newspaper the Morning Chronicle 
in turn remarked on what he considered “an odd thing that all the material 
interests of England are arrayed on the side of the slave-holding South. 
They hold all the cotton; they alone sympathise with you on the doctrine of 
free-trade; they would be your largest customers if they got rid of the tar-
i:  . . . which is only a bounty on the manufactures of the North. . . . England 
should begin to investigate the very important fact, where her true inter-
ests lie—whether with the manufacturing and commercial North, or the 
agricultural South?” The Morning Chronicle recognized that the bill was 
crafted to appeal to Pennsylvania voters but that it also “a: ords abundant 
evidence of what will be the policy of the Northern Union should one 
be formed, and o: ers also a marked contrast to the free-trade policy of 
the South.”30
The Morning Chronicle went even further two weeks later. It noted that 
the tari:  “has laid the fi rst foundation of disunion and secession. . . . The 
Southern revolution stands on two legs, not on one alone—free-trade and 
security of their slave property.” The South had been unconstitutionally 
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and “oppressively taxed . . . for the benefi t of Northern manufacturers. . . . 
This it is which has laid the fi rst foundation of disunion and secession.” 
Even though powerful commercial interests in New York and Boston were 
vocal in protesting against the Morrill TariB , it nevertheless was going to 
pass. The Chronicle concluded that was not the moment for a protective 
tariB . “It will confi rm the alienation of the South from the Union, at the 
same time that it will strengthen the motives of policy on the part of the 
Foreign Governments to recognize the free-trade Southern Confederacy.”31 
Scotland’s Caledonian Mercury concurred; owing to the impact of the 
Morrill TariB  on their exports, the English, French, and Germans, “will 
have to fraternize with the South, notwithstanding its slave institutions.”32 
Within Great Britain’s editorial pages, European recognition of the South 
appeared promising, owing to the latter’s free trade diplomacy.
Less than a month before the bill was signed into law, the Confederacy’s 
president, JeB erson Davis, had already played the free trade trump card in 
his inaugural address. He said that as “an agricultural people, whose chief 
interest is the export of a commodity required in every manufacturing 
country, our true policy is peace and the freest trade which our necessities 
permit.” His speech also notably excluded any direct reference to slavery.33
Britons found Davis’s inaugural address inscrutable—disseminated in 
the British press at about the same time as news arrived of the Morrill 
TariB ’s passage—as was the South’s “object” of secession. One contem-
porary study of English public opinion emphasized editorial confusion 
regarding the address: “Is it the question of slavery or that of free trade? We 
have never read a public document so di\  cult to interpret.” Nevertheless, 
“the tendencies of trade are inexorable. It may be that the Southern popu-
lation will now become our best customers.”34 The conservative London 
Times approved of the Confederacy’s internationalism but perceptively 
asked: “Is the question of Slavery subordinate to that of Free Trade, or is 
Free Trade the bribe oB ered to foreign nations to consideration of their 
pocketing their scruples about Slavery?”35 London’s Once a Week remarked 
in mid-March that “of slavery there is not a word. This is an omission of 
some importance. It must be confessed at the same time that the Northern 
States have chosen a most awkward moment for . . . bringing forward a 
High Protection TariB , which . . . would shut up the States against the 
European manufacturer and producer.”36
Abolitionist and free trade apostle Richard Cobden, though eventu-
ally a strong supporter of the Union, explained England’s confusion to his 
longtime friend, Republican senator Charles Sumner: “There are two sub-
jects on which we [the English] are unanimous and fanatical—personal 
freedom and Free Trade. . . . In your case we observe a mighty quarrel: 
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on one side protectionists, on the other slave-owners. The protectionists 
say they do not seek to put down slavery. The slave-owners say they want 
Free Trade. Need you wonder at the confusion in John Bull’s poor head?”37 
Cobden thereafter frequently attacked the Northeast’s adherence to “the 
old and stupid theory of ‘protection’” and recommended that the North 
instead establish a tariG  for revenue as a “remedy” for its growing foreign 
and domestic ills.38
“Whether it is so intended or not,” remarked London’s Saturday Review, 
the tariG  “must be read as a solemn declaration by the North that it is irre-
trievably severed from the South.”39 Scotland’s widely circulated Dundee 
Courier thought the Morrill TariG  “a sad disaster . . . disastrous to the pros-
perity of the trans-Atlantic republics.” The Morrill TariG  would “be doubly 
impolitic and fatal” when contrasted with the South’s commercial policy; 
“if the North becomes strongly Protectionist, then it is not improbable that 
the trade now concentrated in the harbours of the Northern States will 
remove itself to those of the rival Federation.”40 While war itself appeared 
by no means certain, the tariG  issue appeared to make even peaceful 
reunion impossible.
“Protection was quite as much a cause of the disruption of the Union as 
Slavery,” the London Times pronounced on March 12, 1861, ten days after 
the Morrill TariG  had become law. That day’s editorial was more condem-
natory of Republican failings and diplomatic insensitivity than it was pro-
South in sentiment, and according to Martin Crawford, it “may legitimately 
be viewed,” as the Times’s “editorial manifesto on the disunion crisis.”41 The 
Times also remarked upon how “the TariG  bill has much changed the tone 
of public feeling with reference to the Secessionists, and none here, even 
those whose sympathies are with the Northern States, attempt to justify 
the course which the Protectionists in Congress have pursued.” That same 
day, the London Star stated that the Confederacy “will unquestionably 
make free trade the basis of its commercial policy . . . the injury which the 
Southern States have sustained from the high tariG  upheld by the North 
has had no small share in bringing about their secession.”42
British newspapers continued to voice discontent with the Morrill TariG , 
even as they highlighted growing sectional divisions in the United States. 
Five days after the bill’s passage, England’s Bradford Observer portended 
that the Morrill TariG  “will be a good argument for the Secessionists. . . . 
A better measure could not be hit upon for consolidating the Southern 
confederacy and obtaining recognition of its independence by foreign 
nations.”43 The London Times noted that the tariG ’s passage undid “all the 
progress that has been made in the direction of Free Trade, and in man-
acling their country once more in the fetters of a Protection amounting 
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to prohibition, e+ ectively changing “the tone of public feeling with refer-
ence to the Secessionists, and none here, even those whose sympathies 
are with the Northern States, attempt to justify the course.” Businesses in 
Manchester, SheA  eld, Newcastle, and Wolverhampton waited in “appre-
hension” and “anticipation that the tari+  has become law.”44 One Liverpool 
merchant wrote the Times editors that “the policy, the interest, and the 
inclination of the Southern people are clearly in favour of Free Trade, 
and the Morrill Bill . . . will render a ‘reconstruction’ or a pacifi c ‘compro-
mise’ . . . impossible.”45 London’s conservative Morning Post aptly summed 
up the dilemma: “Slavery, no doubt, is the blight and plague-spot of the 
South; but the North has its plague-spot in this prohibitive tari+ . . . . It 
were well if North and South would say to each other . . . ‘Brother, brother, 
we are both wrong.’”46 Ever the stubborn siblings, neither would.
A few days later, London’s radical Daily News acknowledged that “there 
is probably no event which has attracted so much regretful attention as 
the adoption by the Northern American Union of the Morrill Tari+ .” At 
the same time that France, Russia, Spain, Japan, and China were open-
ing themselves up to “mercantile enterprise,” “the Northern protectionists 
rush in selfi shly with a programme framed in their own interest, and cer-
tain to widen the breach between the disputing sections of the nation. . . . 
It is disgraceful in the present crisis of American a+ airs for these narrow 
politicians to be driving in the wedge of disunion with might and main, 
for the e+ ect of the new fi scal legislation must inevitably be to render a 
reconciliation between the North and South impossible.”47 “If the United 
States persevere in their policy of inactivity,” the She5  eld & Rotherham 
Independent similarly warned, “our government cannot do less than rec-
ognize the de facto government of the South.” The South’s constitution, the 
paper noted, prohibited protection of “any branch of industry” and reduced 
duties enough to “form a very substantial compensation to foreigners for 
the loss sustained by the Morrill tari+  bill.”48 All the North had o+ ered in 
return were prohibitive trade restrictions.
Scotland’s Glasgow Herald reprinted an editorial from the New York 
Herald comparing the northern and southern tari+  policies, though it was 
“impossible to deny to the Southern tari+  an exemplifi cation of statesman-
ship, enlightenment, wisdom, and a knowledge of governing a great and 
enterprising people, which are wholly wanting in the other document.” 
They were as di+ erent “in spirit as the eighteenth and the nineteenth cen-
turies.” The Morrill Tari+  “is the most ignorant, useless, blundering, and 
pernicious enactment that ever was concocted,” while the South’s tari+  “will 
command the admiration” of Europe, “guided by that conviction in their 
policy as regards the two sections. . . . France and England will fi nd little 
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di"  culty now in recognizing the independence of the Confederate States 
of the South. The statesmen of these nations care nothing for our eternal 
nigger question. Their own commercial interests abroad are all in all to 
them.”49 London’s Morning Herald similarly believed the South’s tariB  to 
be “simple and intelligible, while the Northern is complicated, self-contra-
dictory, and, in many points, unintelligible . . . it is easy, therefore, to see 
which set of diplomats . . . is the more likely to succeed. . . . The Southern 
Confederacy has a mighty destiny before it,” while the North was perched 
upon the brink of “ruin.”50 The Herald’s Boston correspondent reported 
on the feeling of gloom in the North: “The passage of the new tariB  law 
was a most egregious blunder,” especially “in the face of the existence of a 
free trade confederacy on our very border” and with the European nations 
bound to look more favorably on the latter.51
“The opinion is becoming universal,” the Morning Post sardonically 
reported, that the northerners “have made a monstrous blunder in pass-
ing the Morrill tariB  law . . . and thus forfeited not a little” of the moral 
high ground.52 The conservative pro-North magazine Fraser’s called the 
new northern tariB  an “aB ront and wrong to the adhering Slave States, and 
raises a wall against the return of the seceders. . . . It gives them an ex post 
facto justifi cation. . . . If such a law could be permanent, its mischief would 
be enormous.”53 It appeared to critics on both sides of the Atlantic that the 
North had to change tactics if it were to undercut possible European rec-
ognition of the Confederacy.
The South, hoisting the free trade banner for its foreign observers, 
appeared to be starting strong at the war’s outset in convincing Europe 
to recognize her independence. “However hollow their reasons for revolu-
tion,” remarked the Bury and Norwich Post, the southerners “have shown 
a degree of energy, perseverance, and tact in carrying out their designs, 
strikingly in contrast with the pusillanimity and vacillating imbecility” of 
the North.54 British conservatives and the Lancaster Gazette speculated 
in turn that the North was in actuality going to war for protectionism 
and empire.55
On May 4, 1861, the Confederate commissioners to England—Mann, 
Rost, and Yancey—gained an interview with John Russell, the British for-
eign secretary, through the eB orts of William Gregory, a sympathetic mem-
ber of the House of Commons. The Morrill TariB , they stated to Russell, 
was the primary cause of secession. The South only desired free trade with 
the world, a sentiment they repeated to Russell in written form on August 
14: the Confederacy could clothe “all the nations of Europe under the 
benign infl uence of peace and free trade.” The commissioners were acting 
under the direct orders of Robert Toombs, then Confederate secretary of 
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state. He also urged them to emphasize that secession had been neces-
sary owing to the “the manufacturing States of the North” historically forc-
ing the South, since 1828, to “pay bounties to northern manufacturers in 
the shape of high protective duties on foreign imports.” This unjust policy, 
Toombs continued, was “strikingly illustrated by the high protective tar-
iE  just adopted by the Government at Washington.” Toombs believed this 
line of argument would show wise Confederate action “in the estimation 
of those countries whose commercial interests, like those of Great Britain, 
are diametrically opposed to protective tariE s.” He expected Great Britain 
“will speedily acknowledge our independence” and granted the commis-
sioners the power to negotiate treaties, for the principle aim “in their policy 
with foreign Governments is peace and commerce.” Toombs even quoted 
Richard Cobden’s maxim that the Confederate states would “buy where you 
can buy cheapest, and sell where you can sell dearest.” With Confederate 
maintenance of a revenue tariE , their policy would “closely approximate 
free trade” and thereby “render their markets peculiarly accessible to the 
manufactories of Europe.”56 Thus, by March 1861, the Confederate state 
department had enunciated through oR  cial channels its policy of free 
trade diplomacy toward Europe.57
The northern and southern views on the tariE  “are fatal to all hopes of 
reconciliation,” remarked the She#  eld & Rotherham Independent in mid-
May, as were the dueling antagonisms of slave and free labor.58 Confederate 
diplomat Edwin de Leon wrote a letter to the editors of the London Times 
on May 25 that slavery was “a mere pretext” for secession, as shown by con-
tinued northern defense of the institution through its guarantee of slavery 
where it existed and through its enforcement of the fugitive slave law.59 By 
the end of May, the pro-free trade Preston Guardian even asserted that 
when northerners cried “no slavery,” they “meant protection.”60
Some Englishmen expressed their doubts as to northern antislavery 
sincerity and sought recognition for the South, not “from any advocacy of 
slavery, but from love of peace and unrestricted commerce, from horror of 
civil war and future years of deadly hatred.”61 William H. Gregory, a mem-
ber of the House of Commons, unsuccessfully led the charge for British 
recognition, arguing that it would bring an end to the slave trade, keep 
the states from fi ghting a “fratricidal, needless war,” and act as retaliation 
against the North’s Morrill tariE . Secession “nullifi es that selfi sh, short-
sighted, retrograde policy, and the Western States ought to be thankful.”62 
Northern minister to England, Charles Francis Adams Sr., after meet-
ing with Britain’s foreign secretary, John Russell, similarly noted that the 
Morrill TariE  and the confl ict’s seeming nonissue of slavery still left south-
ern recognition as a viable option.63 Seward in turn instructed Adams to 
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respond to southern free trade diplomacy with counterarguments that the 
Confederacy could not maintain a policy of free trade during times of war 
and that a war against the Union was much more detrimental to British 
commerce than a protective tari8 .64
To many northerners, Britain’s maintenance of neutrality in turn in-
creasingly appeared to benefi t the South and undermine the Union. Some 
Americans and Englishmen correspondingly began to see the existing tar-
i8  as punishment for Britain’s seemingly ambivalent stance. One north-
erner, for example, suggested that continuance of the Morrill Tari8  was 
chastisement for British neutrality, which northerners viewed as an act of 
hostility. “Had the English Government treated the Secessionists as they 
deserve to be treated,” he wrote in the Morning Post, “there would have 
been prompt sentence of death passed upon the new tari8 , and it would 
have been but a serpent strangled in its cradle.”65 The Morning Post then 
incorrectly asserted that relaxations to the Morrill Tari8  had even been 
tantalizingly held out by the Union’s treasury secretary, Salmon Chase, 
in the hope that it would “induce the British Government to depart from 
that position of neutrality.”66 William Rathbone Greg, in the National 
Review, made “perfectly clear” that England was “unable to sympathise 
heartily with either rival,” as the North was overly ambitious, insolent, and 
England was “aggrieved by her tari8 s,” while the South was “friendly and 
free trading” but also “fanatically slave, and Slavery is the object of our 
rooted detestation.”67
The protectionist–free trade argument remained prevalent in Britain 
from 1861 well into 1862. Liverpool’s avidly pro-South merchant and 
London Times writer James Spence, in his infl uential publication The 
American Union (1861), for instance, spent but one chapter on slavery 
and the other seven on the Morrill Tari8 , the right to secession, and why 
he thought a future reunion was culturally and philosophically impossi-
ble.68 After a close reading of Spence in late 1861, Charles Dickens himself 
became decidedly pro-South and argued in the pages of All the Year Round 
that the Morrill Tari8  had “severed the last threads which bound the North 
and South together.”69 Scotland’s Dundee Courier went so far as to assert 
that if the Morrill Tari8  “were annulled . . . it would act like magic upon the 
trade of this country, and tend to terminate the civil war.”70
John Bright wrote Charles Sumner that the subject of the tari8  was 
“of great importance,” that there was little “that would more restore sym-
pathy between England and the States than the repeal of the present 
monstrous and absurd Tari8 . It gives all the speakers and writers for the 
South an extraordinary advantage in this country in their discussion of 
the American question.”71 Further demonstrating the tari8 ’s transatlantic 
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traction, following the southern rout of northern troops at Bull Run in 
July 1861, New York banker August Belmont, attempting to obtain a Union 
loan from the British, reminded Prime Minister Palmerston of the South’s 
continued maintenance of slavery. Palmerston retorted: “We do not like 
slavery, but we want cotton and we dislike very much your Morrill tariJ .”72
To add moral outrage to economic injury, in November English blan-
kets and clothing had been sent “to save the troops from perishing by the 
thousands in the coming winter” but were excluded from American shores 
owing to the Morrill TariJ ’s prohibitive provisions. The Leeds Mercury 
denounced the North’s “protectionist mania, which in the fi rst place has 
contributed largely to drive oJ  the Southern States from the Union, and 
then actually interfered to prevent the clothing of the Northern armies at 
the most critical period of the war.”73
Figure 1
“Before and After the Morrill Tari6 .” Harper’s, a pro-Union magazine, portrays the 
North’s anger over Britain’s apparent shift from moral outrage to support for Southern 
slavery owing to the Morrill Tari6 ’s passage. “Before the Morrill Tari6 : Mr. Bull (very 
indignant), ‘Back, Sir!—stand back, Sir! I shall protect the poor Negro from your 
bloodthirsty persecutions!’” “After the Morrill Tari6 : Mr. Bull (very indignant once 
more), ‘Take that, you Black Rascal! can’t you attend to your task, and keep the fl ies 
o6  my Friend from the South? My Dear Sir! the only way to manage with those lazy 
Niggers is to drive ’em, drive ’em, Sir! with the lash, Sir!’” (Harper’s Weekly, April 20, 
1861, 256).
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Such continued British support for the Confederacy’s free trade diplo-
macy is all the more remarkable considering that the North controlled 
much of the outgoing information to Europe regarding the war and, until 
the end of 1861, the Confederacy’s oA  cial European propagandistic and 
diplomatic activities had been negligible. Whatever favorable coverage 
they had received thus far was owed predominantly to Britain’s nongov-
ernmental southern sympathizers. Nevertheless, northern control of trans-
atlantic information fl ows was beginning to take its toll on Confederate 
sympathies in Europe. Such an imbalance concerning the coverage of the 
war inspired, fi rst, Confederate secretary of state R. M. T. Hunter and, 
afterward, Hunter’s 1862 replacement, Judah P. Benjamin, to send Henry 
Hotze to England to ghostwrite editorials in leading London newspa-
pers, emphasizing northern tyranny, scientifi c racialism, and the benefi ts 
oQ ered to Great Britain by the Confederacy’s free trade policies. Hotze was 
shocked to fi nd a near lack of any professional Confederate propaganda 
machine within the British press.
Hotze’s own fi rst successes did not come about until February 1862, 
with the Morning Post editorial page opening itself as a promising outlet 
for encouraging British recognition of the Confederacy. Hotze asked the 
paper’s readers if Britain could allow southern cotton and tobacco fi elds 
to be walled in by the Morrill TariQ , “imposed by fi re and sword.” A united 
America and a dependent South, he warned, would oQ er an insular empire 
similar to that of the Chinese: “what should the North care for foreign 
commerce? When it can buy in a close market all it needs, and sell in a 
close market all it produces, what need is there for reciprocal treaties with 
foreign nations?” In subsequent weeks, he also began contributing to the 
London Times, the Standard, the Herald, and the Money Market Review. 
With the fi rst issue appearing in print on May 1, Hotze next created his 
own paper, the Index, to better disseminate Confederate propaganda in 
Britain and France, and its printing continued until August 1865.74
Northern seizure of the Confederacy’s special commissioners bound for 
Europe upon the Trent in late 1861 further agitated already tense Union-
British relations. Amid the aQ air and throughout 1861, Britain’s minis-
ter in Washington, Lord Lyons, had continued to express to Lord John 
Russell his hope that the Morrill TariQ  might be replaced by a revenue tar-
iQ .75 Furthermore, Confederate secretary of state Hunter’s order to James 
Mason, the recently released commissioner to Britain, was that he con-
tinue to London and express, among other sentiments regarding self-gov-
ernment and the right to defend itself, the South’s low import duties and its 
“great interest” in producing and exporting staples, thereby binding “them 
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to the policy of free trade.” Playing on Britain’s free trade heartstrings, he 
was also to stress that the Confederacy’s “empire . . . of free trade” was 
essential to the progress of humankind and “to preserve peace.”76
John Slidell, Confederate special commissioner to France, similarly 
reported such sentiments to the French minister in February 1862.77 
Thurlow Weed, the Union’s unoJ  cial emissary to France, reported to 
Secretary of State William Seward that the French emperor was hinting at 
breaking the Union blockade or recognizing the Confederacy owing to the 
detrimental economic problems striking France, continued northern mili-
tary failures, and the unpopularity of the Morrill TariN .78 A couple weeks 
after Weed’s message, William S. Lindsay, a radical member of Parliament 
and wealthy British shipowner hurt by the northern tariN  and the block-
ade, traveled to Paris to urge Napoleon III to spur English action on the 
matter. On April 11, Lindsay emphasized Confederate propagandistic talk-
ing points to the French emperor: particularly that the North went to war 
not for emancipation but for the Morrill TariN  and southern subjugation.79
In emphasizing that the Civil War was at heart over the issue of slavery, 
John Bright noted in December 1861 that “there is another cause which 
is sometimes in England assigned for this great misfortune, which is, the 
protective theories in operation in the Union, and the maintenance of a 
high tariN  . . . no American . . . attributed the disasters of the Union to that 
cause. It is an argument made use of by ignorant Englishmen, but never by 
informed Americans.” Nor had the tariN  question arisen, he noted, during 
the attempts at compromise in December of the year before. “It is a ques-
tion of slavery” and nothing else.80
When Benjamin took over the Confederate state department in the 
spring of 1862, he wrote to Mason that, owing to the North’s “system of 
deception,” it was “not wise to neglect” European public opinion. Benjamin 
supplied Mason, Hotze, and the Confederate minister to France, John 
Slidell, with the services of Edwin de Leon along with $25,000 to be 
used to enlighten public opinion “through the press” in Great Britain and 
France.81 Mason thereafter put de Leon in touch with his Parisian con-
nections as well as James Spence, one of Britain’s more eN ective southern 
propagandists.82
In Parliament, southern sympathizers like William Lindsay and Wil-
liam Gregory called for recognition of the ostensibly pro-free trade Con-
federacy in order to end the war. Lindsay called for peaceful separation 
and claimed that the war had been caused by longstanding, unjust, and 
injurious northern protectionist taxation upon the South, culminating in 
the Morrill TariN . Gregory called for recognition and declared that “by the 
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new tari(  the rulers of the United States have virtually proclaimed that the 
great American Continent is to be closed to the products of Europe. By the 
Morrill tari(  they resolved on scourging us with whips.” When a pro-Union 
member eloquently responded as to why he believed “that slavery was the 
real cause of the issue,” he was forced to speak over shouts of “No, no!” and 
“The tari( !”83
Such Confederate editorial and parliamentary e( orts apparently paid 
o(  with propagandistic dividends, as recognized by Charles Sumner 
and the Union minister to France, John Bigelow. In mid-October 1862, 
Sumner, who had tried to discourage o( ending England through high tar-
i( s, expressed his own frustration at the general lack of northern support 
in England to John Bright: “We are fi ghting the battle of civilization, and 
their [English] public men and newspapers should recognize and declare 
the true character of the confl ict. . . . And yet this wicked rebellion has 
found backing in England.”84 Richard Cobden and John Bright, it should 
be reiterated, were among the loudest English voices in defending the 
North’s position. Bright in particular continued to give speeches denounc-
ing the tari(  argument, and they had wide reception. For instance, having 
just read Bright’s recent speech in Rochdale, Cassius M. Clay, the Union’s 
Russian ambassador, complimented Bright for showing “so forcibly” that 
“the tari(  had nothing to do with our revolt.”85 Bright’s radical and polariz-
ing pro-Union arguments did have some infl uence in turning British opin-
ion, although his popularity was waning considerably during this time.86
But it was John Stuart Mill who began o( ering the best refutation of 
the protection-free trade thesis in the British press. By the beginning of 
1862, the tari(  issue had gained enough public traction to earn Mill’s intel-
lectual ire, and he proved quite e( ective at voicing his opinion concerning 
slavery’s centrality to the confl ict. He sought to refute “a theory in England, 
believed by some, half believed by many more . . . that, on the side of the 
North, the question is not one of slavery at all.” Assuming this to be true, 
he asked, then “what are the Southern chiefs fi ghting about? Their apolo-
gists in England say that it is about tari( s, and similar trumpery.” Yet the 
southerners “say nothing of the kind. They tell the world . . . that the object 
of the fi ght was slavery.” Mill noted that the Nullifi cation Crisis of 1832—
which had not ended in secession—stemmed from a tari(  so high that the 
Morrill tari(  would look like “a free-trade tari( ” in comparison. “Slavery 
alone was thought of, alone talked of . . . the South separated on slavery, 
and proclaimed slavery as the one cause of separation.” He also predicted 
that the Civil War would soon placate the abolitionists on both sides of 
the Atlantic: particularly that, as the war progressed, “the contest would 
become distinctly an anti-slavery one.”87 Mill’s argument was echoed in 
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J. E. Cairnes’s publication The Slave Power (1862). Cairnes was especially 
“at some pains to show that the question at issue between North and South 
is not one of tariC s,” a view that had “pertinaciously” been “put forward by 
writers in the interest of the South.”88
Ironically, Gladstone and Russell initially used Mill and Cairnes’s argu-
ment to strengthen their support for southern independence.89 London’s 
increasingly pro-North Daily News, however, followed Mill’s counterattack 
with an anti-tariC  argument of its own, observing that, as to the question 
of why the South seceded, “the partisans of secession here, being crafty in 
their generation, are ready with an answer calculated to fi nd its way to the 
English heart. They at once reply, ‘A protectionist policy, a hostile tariC .’” 
The Daily News pointed out, however, that the Morrill TariC  had noth-
ing to do with secession. After all, the Democrats had held a majority in 
the Senate at the time of the tariC ’s movement through the Republican-
controlled House; they could easily have stopped the tariC ’s passage in its 
tracks. “‘The eternal nigger’ stands in bold relief in the front of this horrible 
oC ending. There is no hustling him out of the way, he crops up everywhere. 
TariC s only hide him for a moment.”90
While the slavery cause was thus steadily gaining ground on the South’s 
free trade argument, some British papers nevertheless continued to attri-
bute the Civil War’s cause “not to slavery, but to the Morrill tariC .”91 In late 
May 1862, Scotland’s Glasgow Herald printed a letter stating that secession 
had come about to free the South from its northern dependence and to 
have “free trade with all the world.”92 In response, a pro-North respondent 
asked some insightful questions: “If the Southern Democrats cherished 
free trade so greatly,” he asked, then why had they not given their sup-
port to the free trade northern Democratic presidential candidate Stephen 
Douglas? Why did the senators resign when they had the votes to block the 
Morrill TariC  bill, and why did the secessionist leader from Georgia Robert 
Toombs vote for it? Because they had wanted the tariC  to pass, the north-
ern proponent concluded.93
In part hoping to garner moral support from those in Britain who yet 
thought there was little diC erence between the governments of the North 
and South regarding slavery, Lincoln made his Emancipation Proclamation 
on September 22, 1862. The proclamation’s expected transatlantic gunshot 
initially misfi red; as John Bright observed to Charles Sumner shortly after 
it was made, the proclamation was initially “misrepresented” in England.94 
As Howard Jones has pointed out, “these events of autumn 1862 actually 
heightened British interest in intervention.” Pro-South sentiment among 
the British press stemming from its free trade diplomacy certainly did not 
lessen such interventionist interest. At this time, Britain came closer than 
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ever to conceding to European mediation. Even Richard Cobden, staunch 
opponent of southern slavery and a northern supporter, had himself at fi rst 
feared the use of emancipation as a weapon.95
The Emancipation Proclamation thus initially increased the potential 
for British recognition of the Confederacy, although it would soon help 
in turning the transatlantic debate from tariA s and blockades to slavery. 
By 1863, the tariA  argument had, correspondingly, lost editorial and pub-
lic support, and Mill’s prophecy began to bear fruit, owing to numerous 
nongovernmental northern propagandistic eA orts in England, the Union 
victory at Antietam in September 1862, and a growing acceptance of the 
sincerity of Lincoln’s proclamation.96
Previously in support of peaceful separation and free trade, the lib-
eral Bradford Observer and Leeds Mercury, for instance, ultimately came 
down on the Union side following the proclamation.97 Richard Cobden—
although he condemned the northern blockade and, as Charles Francis 
Adams Jr. described, although the northern tariA  “was odious in his eyes, 
a violation equally of economic principles and of international comity”—
also ultimately gave his wholehearted endorsement to the northern cause 
by December 1862. Cobden wrote Sumner in February 1863 that the 
Emancipation Proclamation had aroused “our old anti-slavery feeling . . . 
and it has been gathering strength ever since.” It also led to meetings, the 
result of which “closed the mouths of those who have been advocating the 
side of the South.” John Bright seconded Cobden’s observation, writing his 
American friend Cyrus Field that “opinion here has changed greatly. In 
almost every town great meetings are being held to pass resolutions in favor 
of the North, and the advocates of the South are pretty much put down.”98
As early as February 1862, Republican proponents had already crossed 
the Atlantic to meet in London to “aid in removing the misapprehensions 
which prevailed,” especially concerning the causes of the Civil War. “It 
was simply slavery, and nothing else,” these northern agents had argued. 
“Neither the Morrill TariA , nor any other causes, had the weight of a feather 
in the matter, except this question of slavery, and the power of extending 
it to the (as yet) unoccupied territories of the Union.”99 A growing British 
belief in the North’s antislavery goals in the months following Lincoln’s 
September proclamation began to make such anti-tariA  propagandistic 
eA orts more eA ective.
Pro-South advocates had created the Manchester Southern Club and 
Southern Independence Associations in Lancashire and London to com-
bat this mounting abolitionist argument, oA ering countering promises that 
the Confederacy would never reopen the slave trade and would ultimately 
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emancipate its slaves. In Parliament, John Roebuck made failed attempts 
to recognize the South, suggesting that the North was hypocritical on the 
slavery issue and “the South oA ers to us perfect free trade.”100
Yet these Confederate arguments were overwhelmed by northern anti-
slavery propaganda. African American and other pro-North advocates 
in turn gained greater success in their attempts to persuade the British 
working class to favor the Union by 1863.101 American abolitionists like 
Henry Ward Beecher, for instance, toured England calling for northern 
support. In October 1863, Beecher told a Liverpool audience, which was 
“foaming” with “madness,” that the Morrill TariA  had in fact only been 
passed “to pay oA  the previous Democratic [Buchanan] administration’s 
debt. . . . It was the South that obliged the North to put the tariA  on.” 
Beecher even promised that “there is nothing more certain in the future 
than that America is bound to join with Great Britain in the worldwide 
doctrine of free trade.”102 Similarly, in March 1864, pro-North Englishman 
Ernest Jones gave a popular speech in Rochdale, noting, “some gentlemen 
here tell you that the rebellion is for free trade—that it was a revolt against 
the Morrill tariA .” Yet it was notable, for example, that the Crittenden 
compromise, proA ered unsuccessfully in December 1860, had contained 
“not one word about free trade or the Morrill tariA . . . . It is slavery in 
the beginning, slavery to the end.”103 Under the growing onslaught of the 
moral-slavery arguments, and even with Beecher’s tantalizing promises 
of future free trade with the Union, the South’s own free trade argument 
correspondingly lost ground.
Noting this trend, the Leeds Mercury recalled in January of 1864 “that 
during the fi rst year of the war slavery was entirely ignored as a cause. . . . At 
that time the public, or at least that portion which could make itself heard, 
resolutely refused to hear a word about slavery, and the ‘Morrill TariA ’ was 
held to be the key to the whole aA air.” It was clear by now “that slavery is 
the chief stone of the corner in the Southern Confederacy. . . . It is only 
the English Confederates” such as the Southern Independence Association 
“who attempt to hide the truth.” Furthermore, “when the British public, 
seeking enlightenment, casts its eyes northwards, it sees the development 
of a policy which shows that slavery has a great deal to do with the object of 
the war, whatever it had to do with the cause of the war. Nominally the war 
is a war against rebellion: practically it is a war against slavery.”104 Similar 
arguments appeared throughout British publications.105
Similarly, in 1865, Goldwin Smith, hoping to stem the tide of anti-Brit-
ish sentiment in the United States, attempted to explain British acceptance 
of the tariA  argument to a Boston audience:
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Had you been able to say plainly at the outset that you were fi ghting 
against Slavery. . . . It would scarcely have been brought to believe that 
this great contest was only about a Tari: . . . . I have heard the Tari:  
Theory called the most successful lie in history. Very successful it cer-
tainly was, and its infl uence in misleading England ought not to be 
overlooked. It was propounded with great skill, and it came out just 
at the right time, before people had formed their opinions, and when 
they were glad to have a theory presented to their minds. But its success 
would have been short-lived, had it not received what seemed authori-
tative confi rmation from the language of statesmen here.106
In conclusion, through an examination of American, Irish, Scottish, 
and English sources, the tari:  takes on a transatlantic signifi cance that has 
been overlooked in previous scholarship. Along with various other trans-
atlantic crises in the fi rst years of the confl ict, the Morrill Tari:  heightened 
anti-northern sentiment as well as the prospects for European recogni-
tion, particularly within the British press. British belief that slavery was 
the central cause of the confl ict did not come to dominate until well into 
the war. It was a few months after Lincoln announced his September 1862 
Emancipation Proclamation before the North and its transnational anti-
slavery allies e: ectively began to counteract the tari:  argument, as well 
as a host of other issues that adversely a: ected Union-British relations. 
Amid a broad array of issues that had led to pro-southern or at least anti-
Union sentiment, they responded with their own moralistic propaganda, 
especially as the war openly turned more and more into a confl ict over 
slavery. Whether or not secessionists foresaw the possible diplomatic ben-
efi ts the tari:  might bring in Europe, the Morrill Tari:  was thereafter used 
e: ectively by the British press, the Confederate state department, and 
Confederate sympathizers throughout free-trading Great Britain during 
the fi rst years of the war.
Although the Morrill Tari:  and other Anglo-American fallouts ulti-
mately failed to gain British recognition of the Confederacy, the British 
press had been quick to take up the South’s free trade propaganda, a stance 
that at the time seemed to enhance the prospect of recognition. By the 
beginning of 1862, the Confederacy began more directly to propagate its 
free trade diplomacy in the British press through agents like Hotze and 
de Leon, and both Union and Confederate supporters recognized the 
infl uence of the tari:  argument upon British public opinion. It was not 
until 1863 that the Union’s advocates had successfully shifted the focus 
of debate from tari: s, blockades, and King Cotton to that of slavery. The 
Confederacy’s free trade diplomacy thus aided in creating transatlantic 
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confusion concerning the Civil War’s causation and in gaining British sup-
port. Alongside the diplomacy of King Cotton, therefore, historians need 
to remember as well the South’s diplomacy of free trade.
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